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Abstract
The paper attempts to analyse asymmetric effects of monetary policy in India using quarterly
data from 1996-97Q1 to 2011-12Q4. It finds that an unanticipated hike and an unanticipated cut in
policy rate have a symmetric impact of on real GDP growth, but differentially impact the components
of real aggregate demand. While the impact on real investment is symmetric, it is asymmetric on real
private and government consumption in that while an unanticipated cut in policy rate leads to their
increase, an unanticipated hike in policy rate has no impact on them. The impact on inflation is also
symmetric. An anticipated policy rate change also has a negative impact on real GDP growth as well
as on the components of real aggregate demand, except for real government consumption. However,
there are ranges where anticipated policy rate changes become neutral to components of aggregate
demand and, thus, on inflation, ranging from 6.25 per cent to 7.0 per cent.
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1Introduction
In recent times, a number of studies have analysed different aspects of the monetary policy
transmission in India (for example, Al-Mashat, 2003; Singh and Kalirajan, 2008; Aleem, 2010;
Bhaumik et al, 2010; Patra and Kapur, 2010; Pandit and Vashisht, 2011; Mohanty, 2012;
Khundrakpam and Jain, 2012; Kapur and Behera, 2012; and Khundrakpam, 2013). The broad
consensus emerging in these efforts is that monetary policy in India works with a lag of about 2-3
three quarters on output and about 3-4 quarters on inflation, with the impact persisting for 8 to 12
quarters. Among the channels of transmission, interest rate is indicated to be the strongest channel.
The underlying assumption in all of them is of symmetric impact of monetary policy and, therefore,
no differentiation is made between positive and negative monetary policy changes. Further, no
distinction has been made between an anticipated and an unanticipated monetary policy changes.
Economic theories have, however, emphasised that monetary policy could have asymmetric
impact on the economy. For the more recent period, there are at least two main strands of theories
explaining the asymmetric impact of monetary policy. First is the credit-rationing hypothesis wherein
agents in credit markets face credit constraints due to information asymmetry. This credit constraint
becomes more binding during recessionary phase than expansionary phase of business cycle. Thus,
policy actions will be more effective when implemented in recessionary situations, as increase in cost
of capital and tighter liquidity conditions will lead to decline in investment demand (Gertler, 1988;
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). The other theory is founded on asymmetry in price flexibility in terms
of downward stickiness. Due to this downward inflexibility of prices, fall in aggregate demand due to
a contractionary monetary policy leads to only reduction in real output. In contrast, rise in aggregate
demand due to expansionary monetary policy moderates the increase in real output due to
accompanying price rise. Thus, a contractionary monetary policy has a stronger impact on real output
than an expansionary monetary policy (Tsiddon, 1993; Ball and Mankiw, 1994).
Empirically, several studies have examined the asymmetric impact of monetary policy on
output and inflation in different countries. Many of them support the view that a contractionary
monetary policy is more effective than an expansionary monetary policy, which include Cover (1993),
Morgan (1993) and Thoma (1994) for the US and Karras (1996a and 1996b) for the European
economies. However, some studies have contested the above findings arguing that asymmetric effects
of money supply on real output is largely influenced by inflation regimes (Rhee and Rich, 1995 and
Shen, 2000). Some studies even argue that the above hypothesis either does not hold or the opposite
in fact holds. Rhee (1995) finds that in Korea there is little empirical support on inflation responding
more to positive monetary shocks than negative shocks. And in the case of Australia, Bodman (2006)
provide the opposite evidence that while an unanticipated expansionary monetary policy raises GDP
growth rate significantly, an unanticipated monetary policy tightening appear to have no effect.
2The asymmetric effect discussed above, however, pertains to unanticipated monetary policy,
as it is based on the premise that only an unanticipated monetary policy has an impact on the real
economy. However, there are others who argue that an anticipated monetary policy can also affect the
real economy (for example, Boschen and Grossman, 1981; and Mishkin, 1982). While an anticipated
monetary policy can affect real economy, the question is whether there exist some threshold level
which separates between its effectiveness and ineffectiveness? In the case of Australia, considering
the average policy rate over the sample period as the threshold level, Bodman (2006) found that while
lower interest rate than the average contributes to output growth, higher than the average interest rate
has no impact.
In the case of India, barring a recent one, there is hardly any study analysing the asymmetric
impact of either an unanticipated or an anticipated monetary policy on the economy. Even this study,
which employs a non-linear VAR, analysed the asymmetric impact of unanticipated change in money
supply, and not interest rate, though in the post-LAF period, interest rate became the main signalling
instrument of monetary policy. It finds that expansionary money supply shocks have a bigger effect
on output than contractionary money supply shocks, but the asymmetric effect last only for few
quarters. On the other hand, negative shocks have a much greater and persistent impact on inflation
than positive shocks (Aye and Gupta, 2012).
In the above backdrop, this paper attempts to provide answers to the following questions in
the Indian context:
i) Does an unanticipated change in the policy rate impacts real GDP and inflation, and
is the impact the same on various components of aggregate demand? If so, is the
impact asymmetric between an unanticipated hike and cut in the policy rate?
ii) Does an anticipated change in policy rate also impact real GDP, inflation and various
components of aggregate demand? If so, is there some threshold level distinguishing
its effectiveness and ineffectiveness?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly describes the methodology.
The empirical estimates and their interpretations are contained in section III. Concluding remarks are
offered in the final section.
II. Methodology
We draw on the literature, but with necessary adaptation, to analyse i) the impact of an
unanticipated change in the policy rate and its asymmetric effect, and ii) impact of an anticipated
change in policy rate and its threshold level on real GDP growth, components of aggregate demand
and inflation in India.
3a. Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate and its Effect
The method adopted is similar to the two step OLS approach as in Cover (1992), Morgan
(1993), Ravn and Sola (2004) and Florio (2005). First, we define an unanticipated change in policy
rate by the residuals of an estimate defining the interest rate setting process. Second, the residuals are
included in the estimate of models for output, components of aggregate demand and inflation to assess
the impact of an unanticipated change in policy rate. Third, to analyse the asymmetric impact, the
residuals are segregated into negative and positive components representing negative and positive
unanticipated change in policy rate, respectively, and are included in the estimate of models for output,
components of aggregate demand and inflation.
In Cover (1992), money supply was considered to analyse the asymmetric impact of monetary
policy on output. Morgan (1993) modified the money supply process by an interest rate setting
process, which was subsequently employed by several others (e.g., Florio, 2005; MacDonald et al,
2011). The argument was that it was more appropriate to consider interest rate as the monetary policy
instrument rather than money supply for most advanced economies. Studies covering EMEs such as
Korea, however, use money supply as the monetary policy instrument, but analysed its asymmetric
impact on inflation rather than output (e.g., Rhee, 1995).
We consider interest rate as the main monetary policy instrument, as monetary targeting in
India was given up by the late 1990s, and use of interest rate as the monetary policy instrument was
increasingly emphasised since the implementation of LAF in the beginning of 2000s. The impact of
an unanticipated change in policy rate is analysed on both real output growth and inflation, and extend
the analysis further to various components of aggregate demand.
The interest rate process is defined as,
ݎ௧= ߙ଴ + ∑ ߙ1௜ݎ௧ି ௜௡௜ି ଵ + ∑ ߙ2௜ߨ௧ି ௜௣௜ି ଴ + ݁ݎ ݏ௧ (1)
In other words, interest rate (rt) is a function of its own lags and lags of inflation (ߨ௧). In (1),
‘݁ݎ ݏ௧’ represents the unanticipated change in policy rate, which can be segregated into positive and
negative components, as pos = max [res, 0] and neg = min [res, 0], respectively.
To analyse the overall impact of unanticipated change in policy rate, the lags ‘݁ݎ ݏ௧’ are
included among the factors explaining real GDP growth, components of aggregate demand and
inflation. For analysing asymmetric impact, the lags of ‘pos’ and ‘neg’ are considered separately in
the same set of equations. For overall impact of an unanticipated change in policy rate, real GDP
growth (yt) is expressed as a function its own lags, inflation (ߨ௧), government deficit (FD) and the
lags of ‘݁ݎ ݏ௧’ as,
ݕ௧= ߛ଴ + ∑ ߛ1௜ݕ௧ି ௜௡௜ି ଵ +∑ ߛ2௜ߨ௧ି ௜௠௜ି ଴ + ∑ ߛ3ܨܦ௜௣௜ି ଴ +∑ ߛ4௜݁ݎ ݏ௧ି ௜௦௜ି ଴ + ௧߳ (2)
As regards the impact of positive and negative interest rate shocks, it is defined as,
ݕ௧= ߛ଴ + ∑ ߛ1௜ݕ௧ି ௜௡௜ି ଵ +∑ ߛ2௜ߨ௧ି ௜௠௜ି ଴ + ∑ ߛ3ܨܦ௜௣௜ି ଴ +∑ ߛ4௜݌݋ݏ௧ି ௜௦௜ି ଴ + ∑ ߛ5௜݊ ݁݃ ௧ି ௜௤௜ି ଴ + ௧߳ (3)
4The sum of the coefficients of ‘pos’ and ‘neg’ viz., ∑ ߛ4௜௦௜ି ଴ and ∑ ߛ5௜௤௜ି ଴ , are the respective
impact of an unanticipated negative and positive change in policy rate. The asymmetry in the impact
between an unanticipated negative and positive change in policy rate is confirmed by a Wald test that
the sum of the coefficients is not equal i.e., ∑ ߛ4௜௦௜ି ଴  ≠∑ ߛ5௜௤௜ି ଴ ≠0.  
To analyse the similar impact on components of real aggregate demand, ‘ݕ௧’ in (2) and (3) is
replaced by the respective components of real aggregate demand, viz., real investment (It), real private
consumption (PCt) and real government consumption (GCt). However, FD was excluded, while for
GC inflation was also excluded, as they were found to be statistically insignificant.1
A similar exercise was carried out for inflation by defining inflation ‘ߨ௧’ i) as a function of its
own lags, lags of GDP gap ‘ܱܩܣ ௧ܲି ௜’ and lags of ‘݁ݎ ݏ௧’ for the overall impact and ii) own lags, lags
of GDP gap ‘ܱܩܣ ௧ܲି ௜’ and lags of ‘pos’ and ‘neg’ for asymmetric impact, respectively, as,
ߨ௧= ߜ଴ + ∑ ߜ1௜ߨ௧ି ௜௡௜ି ଵ + ∑ ߜ2௜݁ݎ ݏ௧ି ௜௣௜ି ଴ + ∑ ߜ3௜ܱ ܩܣ ௧ܲି ௜௤௜ି ଴ + ௧߳ (4)
ߨ௧= ߜ଴ + ∑ ߜ1௜ߨ௧ି ௜௡௜ି ଵ + ∑ ߜ2௜݌݋ݏ௧ି ௜௣௜ି ଴ + ∑ ߜ3௜݊ ݁݃ ௧ି ௜௤௜ି ଴ + ∑ ߜ4௜௦௜ୀଵ ܱܩܣ ௧ܲି ௜+ ௧߳ (5)
b. Impact of Anticipated Change in Policy Rate and its Threshold Level
An anticipated change in policy rate is defined by the fitted values in (1), as they are
components that are predictable through the defined policy rate function. Thus, to examine the
corresponding impact of an anticipated change in policy rate, this fitted component, instead of ‘res’,
is included in equation (2) and (4), and its respective variants representing each components of
aggregate demand. These estimates are the average impact of an anticipated change in policy rate
which, however, could vary substantially at different levels.
Thus, to examine the existence of any differential impact of an anticipated change in policy
rate at different levels, the anticipated changes in policy rate are categorised into two viz., higher than
and lower than relative to a threshold level as,
high = rt if rt > threshold
0 otherwise
low = rtif rt < threshold
0 otherwise
The high and low policy rates are obtained for various assumed threshold levels. We start
from a threshold level of 5.0% and raise it by 25 basis points each time till 8.0%, as there are few
observations outside this range. The high and low policy rate series so defined are then included in (3)
and (5), and their variants for components of aggregate demand. We primarily focus on the behaviour
of the sign and the statistical significance of the coefficient of the series representing high policy rate
as the threshold level rises. This follows, since the estimated average impact also represents the
1 Inclusion of these variables, however, did not make any significant difference to the results.
5coefficient of high policy rate relative to a threshold level which is lower than all the observed data.
Thus, as we raise the threshold level, the number of observations representing high policy rate
decreases, while that of low policy rate increases that the impact could differ substantially from the
average impact.
III. Data and Results
All the relevant quarterly data for the period 1996-97Q1 to 2011-12Q4 were culled from Real
Time Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI. Weighted average call rate was used as a
proxy for policy interest rate. All the relevant variables, except for call rate, were seasonally adjusted,
and found to be stationary by ADF and PP tests.2
a. Impact of an Unanticipated change in Policy Rate and its Effect
The estimate for policy rate process is as in the following.
Callt = 0.71 + 0.80 Call(-1) + 0.462 π(-1) + 8.97 D98Q1 – 7.42 D98Q2 + rest
(1.23) (10.1) (3.20) (7.90) (-5.47)
R-bar Square = 0.74 D.W. = 1.89
In the above estimate, only one lag of the relevant variables were considered, as statistically
insignificant lags were progressively dropped from the starting maximum of four lags. Two dummies
were included to remove an extreme positive and an extreme negative outlier in call rate in 1998Q1
and 1998Q2, respectively. As defined above, the respective unanticipated positive and negative
changes in policy rate were then obtained from the residuals of this estimate.
The number of lags of the dependent variables in their respective estimates was decided by
the statistical significance, with the maximum starting lag length of four, being quarterly data. As for
the number of lags of an unanticipated change in policy rate, we considered three models using four,
six and eight lags. This not only serves as robustness test, but also enables to indirectly observe in
some sense on how long the transmission of monetary policy shocks remains effective. For example,
if the sum of the coefficients is statistically significant for four and six lags but not for eight lags, one
may interpret it as transmission effectively working only up to six quarters3. In the following, the
summary of the results along with their analysis are presented, while the detail results are at Annex 1
to 15.
Impact on Real GDP Growth
An unanticipated change in policy rate has a statistically significant cumulative negative
impact on real GDP growth. This is true for both unanticipated positive and negative change in policy
rate i.e., while an unanticipated hike in policy rate dampens real GDP growth, an unanticipated cut in
2 The results of the unit root tests have not been reported to conserve space.
3 In this regard, a common observation made by most of the recent studies on monetary transmission based on VAR models
in India is that a shock to policy rate on GDP growth and inflation last for about 8 to 10 quarters.
6policy rate enhances real GDP growth. The two impact are also of statistically equal magnitude i.e.,
there is a symmetric impact (Table 1).4
Table 1: Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real GDP Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.29* -0.36* -0.42*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.31* -0.38* -0.35**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.06]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.40* -0.37** -0.54**
[0.01] [0.07] [0.06]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ =∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏ܖ࢏ୀ૚ 0.28 0.00 0.27
[0.60] [0.96] [0.60]
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Impact on Real Investment Growth
An unanticipated change in policy rate also has a significant cumulative negative impact on
real investment growth. And both unanticipated positive and negative change in policy rate has this
negative impact of statistically equivalent magnitude. In other words, an unanticipated hike in policy
rate leads to decline in real investment growth, while an unanticipated cut in interest rate induces an
equivalent real investment growth. However, the impact last longer for an unanticipated hike than that
of an unanticipated cut in policy rate, as in the case of the latter, statistical significant diminishes
substantially by the eight quarter (Table 2).5
Table 2: Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Investment Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -2.61* -2.54* -2.84*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -3.00* -4.42* -4.42*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -3.37* -2.67* -1.95**
[0.00] [0.01] [0.08]
∑ pos௧ି ௜୬௜ୀଵ =∑ ݊݁݃ ௧ି ௜୬௜ୀଵ 0.15 1.59 2.12
[0.70] [0.21] [0.15]
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Impact on Real Private Consumption Growth
With regard to the overall impact of an unanticipated change in policy rate on real private
consumption growth, the cumulative negative impact is statistically significant only with a lag of six
quarters, and that too only for a negative shock (or an unanticipated cut in policy rate), indicating an
asymmetric impact (Table 3). However, the estimates fail to pass the basic statistical diagnostic tests
(Annex Table 5 and 6). Therefore, while a definitive conclusion may not be drawn, the inference
4 The detail estimates presented in Annex Table 1 and 2 pass all the basic diagnostic tests of normality, serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity.
5 The detail estimates presented in Annex Table 3 and 4 show that they pass all the basic diagnostic tests of normality, serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.
7would be that an unanticipated cut in policy rate induces real private consumption growth with a lag
of about six quarters, but an unanticipated hike in policy rate has no impact on real private
consumption growth.
Table 3: Impact of an Unanticipated Policy Shocks on Real Private Consumption Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.19 -0.49* -0.22
[0.35] [0.02] [0.17]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.23 -0.14 -0.02
[0.37] [0.55] [0.94]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.40 -1.10* -0.45**
[0.28] [0.00] [0.10]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ =∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏ܖ࢏ୀ૚ 0.14 4.74* 1.26
[0.71] [0.03] [0.26]
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Impact on Real Government Consumption Growth
An unanticipated change in policy rate, on an average, has no impact on real government
consumption growth. However, when we segregate the impact between positive and negative change
in policy rate, it is seen that while the former has no impact the latter has significant cumulative
negative impact after six quarters, indicating asymmetric impact (Table 4).6 It implies that while
unanticipated cut in policy rate enhances real government consumption growth after about six quarters
after the cut, a similar hike in policy rate has no significant impact.
Table 4: Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Government Consumption
Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.41 -0.04 0.19
[0.60] [0.97] [0.84]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ 0.33 1.59 1.88
[0.76] [0.144] [0.21]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -1.66 -3.42* -1.06
[0.27] [0.03] [0.61]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ =∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏ܖ࢏ୀ૚ 1.04 5.81* 1.05
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Impact on Inflation
As with real GDP growth, an unanticipated change in policy rate has a significant cumulative
negative impact on inflation. The impact gets stronger as the number of lags increase from four to
eight, indicating that the impact last more than eight quarters. The cumulative negative impact on
inflation is true for both the unanticipated positive and negative change in policy rate. In other words,
an unanticipated hike in policy rate lowers inflation, while an unanticipated cut in policy rate raises
inflation of similar magnitude, indicating symmetric response. However, while inflation reducing
6 The detail estimates presented in Annex Table 7 and 8 show that they pass all the basic diagnostic tests of normality, serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.
8impact of an unanticipated hike in policy rate last less than eight quarters, inflation inducing impact of
unanticipated cut in policy rate last for more than eight quarters (Table 5).7
Table 5: Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Inflation
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.29* -0.46* -0.60
[0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.29* -0.43* -0.44
[0.05] [0.02] [0.14]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.56* -0.60* -0.80*
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ =∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏ܖ࢏ୀ૚ 1.22 0.38 0.55
[0.27] [0.54] [0.46]
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
b. Impact of an Anticipated Change in Policy Rate and its Threshold Level
An anticipated change in policy rate also has a significant cumulative negative impact on real
GDP growth lasting for more than eight quarters.8 It also has a similar cumulative negative impact
lasting more than eight quarters on real investment growth.9 An anticipated change in policy rate has a
cumulative negative impact on private consumption growth only after six quarters,10 but has no
significant impact on real government consumption growth.11 As regards inflation, an anticipated
change in policy rate has a significant negative cumulative impact on inflation lasting more than eight
quarters as in the case of real GDP and investment growth (Table 19).
Table 6: Impact of an Anticipated Change in Policy Rate
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Real GDP Growth -0.25* -0.37* -0.47*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Real Investment Growth -2.19* -2.87* -3.47*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Real Private Consumption -0.26 -0.13 -0.33*
[0.15] [0.49] [0.04]
Real Government Consumption -0.34 -0.19 -0.65
[0.65] [0.82] [0.46]
Inflation -0.44* -0.48* -0.50*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
7 The detail estimates presented in Annex Table 9 and 10 show that they pass all the basic diagnostic tests of normality, serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.
8 The detail estimates presented in Annex Table 11 show that they pass all the basic diagnostic tests of normality, serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.
9 The detail estimates presented in Annex Table 12 show that they pass all the basic diagnostic tests of normality, serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.
10 The detail estimates presented in Annex Table 13 show that only the model with eight lag pass the basic diagnostic tests of
normality, serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
11 The detail estimates presented in Annex Table 14 show that they pass all the basic diagnostic tests of normality, serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.
9As for the threshold level of anticipated change in policy rate, it is seen that policy rate
change between 6.25 to 7.0 per cent has no statistically insignificant negative impact on real GDP
growth. Outside this range, higher policy rate than the threshold has a statistically significant negative
impact. In other words, anticipated policy rate could be neutral to real GDP growth in the range of
6.25 to 7.0 per cent. In the case of real investment growth, this range where anticipated policy rate is
neutral narrows down considerably to about 6.5 per cent with the increase in the number of lags to
eight. With regard to real private consumption growth, anticipated policy rate is neutral at any level
up to six quarters, but by the eight quarter after the change, it is neutral only in the range of 6.0 to 7.0
per cent. Unlike other components of aggregate demand, anticipated policy rate is neutral to real
government consumption at any level and for any number of lags. As regards inflation, the range
where anticipated policy rate is neutral is much narrower irrespective of the number of lags, and
similar to that of real investment growth at about 6.5%.
Table 7: Threshold Levels of Anticipated Change in Policy Rate
Rate Real GDP Real Investment Real Private
Consumption
Real
Government
Consumption
Inflation
n=4 n=6 n=8 n=4 n=6 n=8 n=4 n=6 n=8 n=4 n=6 n=8 n=4 n=6 n=8
8.00% -0.26*
(0.01)
-0.36*
(0.00)
-0.41*
(0.02)
-2.54
(0.00)
-3.15
(0.00)
-3.95
(0.00)
-0.30
(0.15)
-0.12
(0.60)
-0.40*
(0.04)
-0.41
(0.64)
0.26
(0.79)
-0.52
(0.66)
-0.41*
(0.00)
-0.42*
(0.01)
-0.42*
(0.01)
7.75%
7.50%
7.25%
7.00%
6.75%
6.50%
6.25%
6.00%
5.75%
5.50%
5.25%
5.00%
-0.24*
(0.02)
-0.27*
(0.03)
-0.27
(0.12)
-0.21
(0.12)
-0.12
(0.43)
0.16
(0.39)
0.09
(0.59)
-0.20
(0.20)
-0.27*
(0.06)
-0.24*
(0.06)
-0.28*
(0.01)
-0.28*
(0.00)
-0.35*
(0.01)
-0.40*
(0.00)
-0.39*
(0.00)
-0.25
(0.13)
-0.16
(0.41)
-0.03
(0.91)
-0.15
(0.55)
-0.42*
(0.03)
-0.49*
(0.00)
-0.42*
(0.00)
-0.40*
(0.00)
-0.38*
(0.00)
-0.42*
(0.03)
-0.43*
(0.01)
-0.50*
(0.00)
-0.28
(0.15)
-0.18
(0.42)
0.06
(0.87)
-0.19
(0.55)
-0.62*
(0.02)
-0.69*
(0.00)
-0.59*
(0.00)
-0.62*
(0.00)
-0.51*
(0.00)
-2.51*
(0.00)
-1.61*
(0.06)
-1.5**
(0.07)
-1.00
(0.26)
-0.72
(0.46)
-0.40
(0.75)
-1.89
(0.13)
-2.15*
(0.04)
-1.85*
(0.04)
-2.64*
(0.00)
-2.51*
(0.00)
-2.48*
(0.00)
-3.07*
(0.00)
-2.27*
(0.01)
-2.24
(0.01)
-1.33
(0.19)
-0.88
(0.42)
-0.35
(0.83)
-2.45
(0.14)
-2.98*
(0.01)
-3.03*
(0.01)
-3.63*
(0.00)
-3.08*
(0.00)
-3.09*
(0..00)
-3.91*
(0.00)
-3.29*
(0.00)
-3.17*
(0.00)
-2.50*
(0.02)
-2.16*
(0.06)
-1.72
(0.37)
-3.84*
(0.02)
-4.00*
(0.00)
-3.98*
(0.00)
-3.81*
(0.00)
-3.97*
(0.00)
-3.49*
(0.00)
-0.16
(0.46)
-0.21
(0.38)
-0.18
(0.46)
-0.46
(0.12)
-0.33
(0.35)
-0.38
(0.37)
-0.44
(0.29)
-0.49
(0.17)
-0.41
(0.19)
-0.32
(0.27)
-0.24
(0.31)
-0.25
(0.22)
0.17
(0.47)
0.03
(0.91)
-0.03
(0.90)
-0.01
(0.98)
0.31
(0.39)
0.41
(0.46)
0.40
(0.44)
0.06
(0.87)
-0.02
(0.94)
-0.10
(0.75)
-0.16
(0.52)
-0.22
(0.32)
-0.4**
(0.08)
-0.4*
(0.07)
-0.4**
(0.06)
-0.25
(0.33)
-0.12
(0.70)
-0.30
(0.56)
-0.46
(0.33)
-0.40
(0.25)
-0.4**
(0.08)
-0.4**
(0.08)
-0.41*
(0.04)
-0.37*
(0.02)
0.15
(0.87)
-0.34
(0.75)
-0.56
(0.62)
-1.61
(0.19)
-1.63
(0.25)
-1.63
(0.34)
0.00
(0.99)
0.55
(0.71)
1.46
(0.26)
0.25
(0.83)
0.16
(0.87)
-0.36
(0.67)
0.69
(0.50)
-0.02
(0.99)
-0.71
(0.58)
-0.80
(0.57)
-0.59
(0.72)
-1.50
(0.53)
-0.43
(0.86)
0.41
(0.81)
0.83
(0.56)
0.47
(0.73)
0.19
(0.86)
-0.04
(0.96)
0.53
(0.72)
-1.82
(0.24)
-2.84
(0.16)
-2.11
(0.22)
-1.92
(0.34)
-4.15
(0.12)
-2.69
(0.34)
-0.27
(0.90)
0.76
(0.64)
0.59
(0.66)
0.42
(0.71)
-0.40
(0.69)
-0.40*
(0.01)
-0.46*
(0.00)
-0.50*
(0.00)
-0.54*
(0.00)
-0.52*
(0.01)
-0.22
(0.36)
-0.28
(0.18)
-0.45*
(0.02)
-0.45*
(0.01)
-0.34*
(0.06)
-0.43*
(0.00)
-0.49*
(0.00)
-0.39*
(0.02)
-0.43*
(0.02)
-0.48*
(0.01)
-0.60*
(0.01)
-0.67*
(0.01)
-0.43
(0.25)
-0.5**
(0.10)
-0.63*
(0.01)
-0.57*
(0.01)
-0.4**
(0.08)
-0.46*
(0.01)
-0.43*
(0.00)
-0.4**
(0.07)
-0.4**
(0.09)
-0.4**
(0.06)
-0.49*
(0.05)
-0.5**
(0.06)
-0.70
(0.13)
-0.89*
(0.02)
-0.98*
(0.00)
-0.71*
(0.01)
-0.4**
(0.10)
-0.41*
(0.03)
-0.46*
(0.01)
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively; Figures in parentheses are p-values of chi-square tests.
Conclusion
Several studies have analysed monetary policy transmission in India and have shown its
effectiveness through the operation of most of the traditional channels. However, these studies have
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either implicitly or explicitly assumed symmetric impact of tight and easy monetary policy. Economic
theories, however, emphasise that tight and easy monetary policy could have an asymmetric impact
on the economy. Unlike for several other countries, there is hardly any study analysing this aspect of
asymmetric transmission of monetary policy particularly that of interest rate, for India. Further, the
analysis on monetary policy transmission has been confined to an unanticipated change in monetary
policy, though in the literature there are arguments supporting effectiveness of an anticipated change
in monetary policy as well. Thus, the paper was an attempt to fill this gap using quarterly data from
1996-97Q1 to 2011-12Q4.
The paper finds that an unanticipated hike and an unanticipated cut in policy rate have a
symmetric impact on real GDP growth lasting for more than eight quarters. However, they have a
differential impact on various components of real aggregate demand. On real investment growth,
though the impact is symmetric, real investment growth reducing impact of an unanticipated policy
rate hike is more persistent than that of real investment growth enhancing impact of an unanticipated
policy rate cut. In contrast, while an unanticipated hike in policy rate has no impact on the growth of
real private consumption and real government consumption, an unanticipated cut in policy rate
increases their growth after four quarters, but last no more than eight quarters.
Unanticipated hike/cut in policy rate has a symmetric impact of reducing/increasing inflation.
However, inflation reducing impact of unanticipated policy rate hike is less persistent - last less than
eight quarters - as compared to inflation inducing impact of unanticipated cut in policy rate – last
more than eight quarters.
Anticipated policy rate hike also has a negative impact on real GDP growth as well as on the
components of real aggregate demand, except for real government consumption. But, while the
impact on real private consumption growth is felt only after six quarters, on real investment growth
and real GDP growth it is felt within four quarters. However, at certain levels, anticipated policy rate
is found to be ineffective or neutral. This neutral level ranges between 6.25 to 7.0 per cent for real
GDP growth and real private consumption growth, but is much narrower at about 6.5 per cent for real
investment growth and inflation.
A policy inference that can be drawn, particularly from the perspective of an emerging economy
striving for higher economic growth, is that while policy rate shocks could effectively control
aggregate demand, and therefore, inflation in the short-run, that the effect works primarily through
growth in investment may have implications on real output growth beyond the short-run. Weak
response of real private consumption growth to policy rate could be due to cash intensive nature of
consumption. In that case, money supply could still be a relevant monetary policy instrument.
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Annex 1: Average Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real GDP Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.018* 0.019* 0.019*
(5.98) (5.51) (5.05)
∑ ݕ௧ି ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ 0.20 0.13 0.09
[0.24] [0.51] [0.68]
π(t) -0.19* -0.19* -0.21*
(-2.60) (-2.52) (-2.49)
FDt-1 -0.005* -0.005* -0.005
(-2.80) (-2.79) (-2.57)
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.29* -0.36* -0.42*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Jarque-Bera 0.31 0.26 0.01
[0.86] [0.88] [0.99]
LM-Test 0.08 0.07 0.02
[0.93] [0.93] [0.99]
BPG 0.79 0.90 0.99
[0.65] [0.56] [0.49]
R-bar Square 0.52 0.52 0.49
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. A dummy variable defined as 1 for 2002Q1 and 2004Q1 and zero
otherwise was included in all the three models to remove outliers.
Annex 2: Asymmetric Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real GDP Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.018* 0.019* 0.019*
(5.78) (4.95) (4.56)
∑ ݕ௧ି ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ 0.15 0.10 0.014
[0.38] [0.62] [0.96]
π(t) -0.19* -0.19* -0.17**
(-2.43) (-2.21) (-1.83)
FDt-1 -0.004* -0.005* -0.005
(-2.21) (-2.22) (-2.43)
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.31* -0.38* -0.35**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.06]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.40* -0.37** -0.54**
[0.01] [0.07] [0.06]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ =∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏ܖ࢏ୀ૚ 0.28 0.00 0.27
[0.60] [0.96] [0.60]
Jarque-Bera 0.12 0.39 0.24
[0.94] [0.82] [0.89]
LM-Test 0.04 0.18 0.32
[0.96] [0.75] [0.73]
BPG 1.15 1.28 0.87
[0.34] [0.25] [0.64]
R-bar Square 0.51 0.49 0.49
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. A dummy variable defined as 1 for 2002Q1 and 2004Q1 and zero
otherwise was included in all the three models to remove outliers.
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Annex 3: Average Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Investment
Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.04* 0.04* 0.04*
(5.02) (4.49) (4.49)
It-1 -0.39* -0.37* -0.27*
(-6.18) (-3.35) (-2.59)
π(t) -0.69 -0.68 -0.86**
(-1.45) (-1.39) (-1.82)
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -2.61* -2.54* -2.84*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Jarque-Bera 0.32 0.38 0.44
[0.85] [0.83] [0.80]
LM-Test 0.15 0.42 0.74
[0.86] [0.66] [0.48]
BPG 1.04 1.01 1.12
[0.42] [0.45] [0.37]
R-Bar Square 0.86 0.86 0.89
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Two dummy variables, the first defined as 1 for 1999Q2 and Q3
and zero otherwise, and the second defined as 1 for 2007Q4 and 2010Q1 and zero otherwise, were included in all the three
models to remove positive and negative outliers, respectively.
Annex 4: Asymmetric Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Investment
Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.044* 0.065* 0.071*
(5.46) (6.43) (6.62)
It-1 -0.45* -0.738* -0.782*
(-7.39) (-5.54) (-5.56)
π(t) -0.947* -1.16* -1.06*
(-2.43) (-3.03) (-2.73)
(-4.08) (-4.27) (-5.07)
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -3.00* -4.42* -4.42*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -3.37* -2.67* -1.95**
[0.00] [0.01] [0.08]
∑ pos௧ି ௜୬௜ୀଵ =∑ ݊݁݃ ௧ି ௜୬௜ୀଵ 0.15 1.59 2.12
[0.70] [0.21] [0.15]
Jarque-Bera 2.06 0.26 0.33
[0.36] [0.88] [0.85]
LM-Test 0.53 1.34 2.44
[0.59] [0.27] [0.10]
BPG 0.54 0.56 0.67
[0.88] [0.89] [0.83]
R-bar Square 0.91 0.92 0.93
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Two dummy variables, the first defined as 1 for 1999Q2 and Q3
and zero otherwise, and the second defined as 1 for 2007Q4 and 2010Q1 and zero otherwise, were included in all the three
models to remove positive and negative outliers, respectively.
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Annex 5: Average Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Private
Consumption Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.02* 0.02* 0.02*
(8.35) (9.11) (5.14)
PCt-1 -0.42* -0.46* 0.08
(-3.33) (-3.86) (0.65)
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.19 -0.49* -0.22
[0.35] [0.02] [0.17]
Jarque-Bera 540.0* 108.0* 1.77
[0.00] [0.00] [0.41]
LM-Test 0.89 12.7* 1.42
[0.42] [0.00] [0.25]
BPG 1.17 2.10** 1.46
[0.34] [0.06] [0.19]
R-bar Square 0.11 0.26 0.68
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Annex 6: Asymmetric Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Private
Consumption Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.021* 0.016* 0.014*
(5.60) (4.68) (5.14)
PCt-1 -0.40* -0.40* 0.02
(-3.02) (-3.71) (0.18]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.23 -0.14 -0.02
[0.37] [0.55] [0.94]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.40 -1.10* -0.45**
[0.28] [0.00] [0.10]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ =∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏ܖ࢏ୀ૚ 0.14 4.74* 1.26
[0.71] [0.03] [0.26]
Jarque-Bera 594* 11.8* 3.84
[0.00] [0.00] [0.15]
LM-Test 2.07 2.17 0.94
[0.14] [0.13] [0.40]
BPG 0.67 0.90 0.79
[0.73] [0.56] [0.69]
R-bar Square 0.12 0.45 0.80
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Annex 7: Average Impact of Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Government
Consumption Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.02* 0.03* 0.03*
(2.67) (3.00) (2.72)
∑ ܩܥ௧ି ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ -0.44 -0.78* -0.71**
[0.16] [0.03] [0.08]
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.41 -0.04 0.19
[0.60] [0.97] [0.84]
Jarque-Bera 0.40 0.26 0.55
[0.82] [0.88] [0.76]
LM-Test 0.59 0.40 0.04
[0.56] [0.67] [0.96]
BPG 0.82 0.62 0.76
[0.59] [0.79] [0.69]
R-bar Square 0.35 0.38 0.38
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Annex 8: Asymmetric Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Government
Consumption Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.016 0.001 0.01
(1.24) (0.09) (0.59)
∑ ܩܥ௧ି ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ -0.63** -1.04* -0.43
[0.09] [0.01] [0.35]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ 0.33 1.59 1.88
[0.76] [0.144] [0.21]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -1.66 -3.42* -1.06
[0.27] [0.03] [0.61]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ =∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏ܖ࢏ୀ૚ 1.04 5.81* 1.05
[0.31] [0.02] [0.31]
Jarque-Bera 0.47 0.18 3.50
[0.79] [0.92] [0.17]
LM-Test 0.85 0.09 0.58
[0.43] [0.91] [0.57]
BPG 0.77 0.88 0.69
[0.68] [0.60] [0.81]
R-bar Square 0.32 0.44 0.47
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Annex 9: Average Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Inflation
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
(6.34) (6.51) (6.43)
∑ π௧ି ௜
ଶ
௜ୀଵ 0.16 0.07 0.04
[0.17] [0.59] [0.78]
OGAP(-3) 0.17 0.23** 0.28*
(1.55) (2.00) (2.26)
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.29* -0.46* -0.60
[0.02] [0.00] [0.00]
Jarque-Bera 2.24 3.36 2.66
[0.33] [0.19] [0.27]
LM-Test 0.11 0.23 0.11
[0.90] [0.80] [0.90]
BPG 0.66 0.60 0.77
[0.74] [0.82] [0.68]
R-bar Square 0.48 0.50 0.52
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. *
and ** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Two dummy variables, the first defined as 1 for 2000Q4 and
zero otherwise, and the second defined as 1 for 2008Q4 were included in all the three models to remove positive and
negative outliers, respectively.
Annex 10: Asymmetric Impact of an Unanticipated Change in Policy Rate on Inflation
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.011* 0.013* 0.011*
(4.85) (4.60) (2.92)
∑ π௧ି ௜
ଶ
௜ୀଵ 0.13 0.032 0.092
[0.26] [0.82] [0.54]
OGAP(-3) 0.264* 0.286* 0.265**
(2.28) (2.33) (1.89)
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.29* -0.43* -0.44
[0.05] [0.02] [0.14]
∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.56* -0.60* -0.80*
[0.01] [0.02] [0.01]
∑ ܘܗܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ =∑ ࢔ࢋࢍ࢚ି ࢏ܖ࢏ୀ૚ 1.22 0.38 0.55
[0.27] [0.54] [0.46]
Jarque-Bera 2.70 3.10 2.03
[0.26] [0.21] [0.36]
LM-Test 0.24 0.16 0.42
[0.78] [0.85] [0.66]
BPG 0.54 0.50 0.55
[0.89] [0.93] [0.92]
R-bar Square 0.51 0.49 0.49
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Two dummy variables, the first defined as 1 for 2000Q4 and zero
otherwise, and the second defined as 1 for 2008Q4 were included in all the three models to remove positive and negative
outliers, respectively.
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Annex 11: Average Impact of an Anticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real GDP Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.04* 0.05* 0.05*
(4.44) (4.57) (4.37)
∑ ݕ௧ି ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ 0.18 0.02 0.12
[0.32] [0.92] [0.63]
π(t) -0.24* -0.22* -0.23*
(-2.98) (-2.74) (-2.69)
FDt-1 -0.005* -0.006* -0.005
(-2.82) (-3.09) (-2.77)
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.25* -0.37* -0.47*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Jarque-Bera 0.17 0.49 0.52
[0.92] [0.78] [0.77]
LM-Test 0.22 0.08 0.06
[0.81] [0.92] [0.94]
BPG 0.22 1.39 1.24
[0.30] [0.20] [0.28]
R-bar Square 0.50 0.52 0.52
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. A dummy variable defined as 1 for 2002Q1 and 2004Q1 and zero
otherwise was included in all the three models to remove outliers.
Annex 12: Average Impact of an Anticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Investment Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.19* 0.24* 0.29*
(4.57) (5.72) (7.22)
It-1 -0.44* -0.58* -0.57*
(-5.80) (-4.81) (-5.26)
π(t) -1.00** -1.17* -1.42*
(-1.92) (-2.39) (-3.27)
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -2.19* -2.87* -3.47*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Jarque-Bera 0.43 1.93 0.17
[0.81] [0.38] [0.65]
LM-Test 1.58 1.27 1.68
[0.22] [0.29] [0.20]
BPG 1.11 1.50 0.98
[0.37] [0.17] [0.48]
R-Bar Square 0.84 0.87 0.90
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Two dummy variables, i) 1 for 1999Q2 and Q3 and zero
otherwise, and ii) 1 for 2007Q4 and 2010Q1 and zero otherwise, were included in all the three models to remove positive
and negative outliers, respectively.
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Annex 13: Average Impact of an Anticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Private
Consumption Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.04* 0.03* 0.04*
(3.16) (2.39) (3.42)
PCt-1 -0.42* -0.43* -0.12
(-3.41) (-3.67) (-0.83)
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.26 -0.13 -0.33*
[0.15] [0.49] [0.04]
Jarque-Bera 533.5* 42.1* 0.52
[0.00] [0.00] [0.77]
LM-Test 2.15 14.2* 1.53
[0.13] ([0.00] [0.23]
BPG 0.41 2.85* 1.78
[0.84] [0.01] [0.10]
R-bar Square 0.13 0.28 0.67
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Annex 14: Average Impact of an Anticipated Change in Policy Rate on Real Government
Consumption Growth
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.05 0.04 0.07
(0.93) (0.75) (1.21)
∑ ܩܥ௧ି ௜
ସ
௜ୀଵ -0.45 -0.84* -0.98*
[0.20] [0.02] [0.02]
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.34 -0.19 -0.65
[0.65] [0.82] [0.46]
Jarque-Bera 0.85 1.56 1.25
[0.65] [0.46] [0.54]
LM-Test 0.72 1.54 0.29
[1.73] [0.23] [0.75]
BPG 0.49 0.55 0.65
[0.86] [0.84] [0.78]
R-bar Square 0.23 0.29 0.33
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets are probability of the respective tests. * and
** denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Annex 15: Average Impact of an Anticipated Change in Policy Rate on Inflation
Variables n=4 n=6 n=8
Constant 0.04* 0.05* 0.05*
(4.91) (4.62) (4.40)
∑ π௧ି ௜
ଶ
௜ୀଵ 0.04 0.03 0.11
[0.79] [0.83] [0.49]
OGAP(-3) 0.27* 0.28* 0.35*
(2.43) (2.36) (2.84)
∑ ܚ܍ܛ࢚ି ࢏
ܖ
࢏ୀ૚ -0.44* -0.48* -0.50*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Jarque-Bera 2.74 2.72 2.66
[0.25] [0.26] [0.26]
LM-Test 0.19 0.06 0.40
[0.83] [0.94] [0.67]
BPG 0.59 0.71 0.81
[0.80] [0.72] [0.65]
R-bar Square 0.54 0.52 0.55
Figures in round brackets indicate t-statistics while the figures in square brackets probability of the respective tests. * and **
denote, significance at 5% and 10% level, respectively. Two dummy variables, the first defined as 1 for 2000Q4 and zero
otherwise, and the second defined as 1 for 2008Q4 were included in all the three models to remove positive and negative
outliers, respectively.
